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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is properly before this Court pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in granting the Christiansen' Motion to

Compel

Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions and Requests for

Production?
2.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying Farmers' Motion to Stay the

Bad Faith Action?
Except for a difference in the standard of review, the issues above are the same
as those listed by Farmers under Issues Presented for Review in its original Petition for
Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, page 4. Such are the issues which this
Court specifically agreed to address when it granted Farmers' Petition for Permission
to Appeal Interlocutory Order on December 10, 2003.
Perhaps in an effort to avoid the "abuse of discretion" standard of review
discussed in detail hereafter, Farmers has chosen in its Brief on Appeal to modify the
issues that it originally presented for review, which issues formed the basis for this
Court's Order granting the Petition for Permission to Pursue Interlocutory Appeal in
the first place.
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The Christiansens request that this Court consider addressing the permitted
issues as originally presented for review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appropriate standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to
compel discovery is the "abuse of discretion" standard (Archeleta v. Hughes* 969 P.2d
409, 414 (UT 1998); and Roundv v. Stalev. 984 P.2d 404 (UT App. 99)). Indeed, trial
courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery, and an appellate court will not
find an abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no
evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling (Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (UT
1996)).
As to the second issue of whether the Trial Court properly denied Defendant
Farmers' Motion for Stay, determination of the appropriate standard of review is more
complicated. The decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for stay is controlled,
in part, by § 78-3la-108(7) Utah Code Annotated, which states as follows:
"If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any
judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a
claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay
to that claim." (Emphasis added.)
A trial court's interpretation of a statute is generally "reviewed for correctness"
(as in Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc.* 15 P.3d 1030 (UT 2000)).
However, built into this particular statute is an express grant of discretion to the trial
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court. Specifically, "the court may limit the stay to that claim [i.e., the claim being
arbitrated]." That is precisely the way the Trial Court exercised its discretion in this
case, - it limited the stay to the UIM claim which was diverted into arbitration. In
severing the claims and limiting the stay to the UIM claim in arbitration, the Trial
Court specifically referenced the statutory grant of discretion in its Minute Entry ("the
court is afforded discretion in the statute . ...") (R. 174).
Where a trial court is expressly vested with discretion, the appropriate point on
the standard of review spectrum should fall closer to an "abuse of discretion" standard
than to "de novo" review or "review for correctness". This conclusion is stressed in
the in-depth standard of review tutorial provided by this Court in the case of State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (UT 1994), wherein the Court explained: "At this point, we must
attempt to determine when the articulated legal rule to be applied to a set of facts - - a
rule that we establish without deference to the trial courts - - embodies a de facto grant
of discretion which permits the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions
about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal"

(Italics

added.)
Simply put, a statutory grant of discretion to the trial court favors use of the
"abuse of discretion" standard of review. This principle was followed by the Utah
Supreme Court in the case of Lund v. Brown* 11 P.3d 277 (UT 2000), where the high
court reviewed a trial court's exercise of discretion afforded by Rule 60(b) Utah Rules
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of Civil Procedure, in refusing to vacate a default judgment. Although the Justices
cautioned that the Trial Court's discretion is not unlimited, the Lund Court concluded,
"We review the Trial Court's decision in the instant case for abuse of discretion".
While Plaintiffs' agree with the Court's observation in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932 (UT 1994) that the answer to the standard of review question is not always black
and white, Plaintiffs' urge this Court to acknowledge the discretion afforded trial
courts in the Arbitration/Severance/Stay of Claims Statute and, accordingly, apply
something approaching the "abuse of discretion" standard of review to the Trial
Court's decision to limit the Stay to the UIM claim in arbitration.
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT
The issues presented on appeal were preserved by Defendant's Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Feiith and Associated
Causes; Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Request for a
Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c) (R. 117-127)' and Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration (R. 177-178, 180-199).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 78-3la-108(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms
shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a
claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.
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History: C. 1953, 78-31a-108, enacted by L. 2002, ch. 326 § 8. Effective dates.
Laws 2002, ch 326, § 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case: This is a first-party breach of contract lawsuit filed by Byron
and Merrilee Christiansen against their own auto insurance carrier, Farmers Insurance
Exchange.
In their Complaint, the Christiansen's stated two separate causes of action that
are relevant to this appeal. The first was an action to enforce Farmers' contractual
obligation to pay underinsured motorist (hereinafter "UIM") benefits to the
Christiansens pursuant to the written provisions of the policy, in return for the
Christiansens' payment of insurance premiums. That first claim stems from injuries
Mr. Christiansen sustained when he was rear ended by an underinsured motorist on
May 10, 2001. Farmers' obligation as to this first claim arose when the other driver's
insurance company tendered inadequate liability policy limits, and the Christiansens
filed a claim under their own Farmers UIM coverage for the remaining damages.
Farmers failed to pay the UIM claim, or to even take a position as to the claim, which
forced this cause of action to collect the Christiansens' UIM benefits.
The Christiansens' Second Cause of Action is for Farmers' first-party breach of
implied contractual duties; namely, Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith
And Fair Dealing. As alleged, such duties include, "among others, duties to diligently
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investigate the facts to determine if their claims are valid, duties to fairly evaluate their
claims, duties to act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling their claims,
duties to avoid conflicts of interest, and duties to refrain from actions which would
injure Byron or Merrilee Christiansens' ability to promptly obtain appropriate UIM
compensation" (R. 5).
The Christiansens1 Second Cause of Action includes allegations that Farmers
breached its good faith, implied contractual duties to the Christiansens, as well as
allegations that Farmers instituted and followed, "a general bad faith business practice
of compelling its own insureds to institute litigation or arbitration before granting
reasonable settlement authority, or any dollar settlement authority, thereby deliberately
delaying fair and equitable settlement of first-party claims in which liability is
reasonably clear" (R. 6).
Relative to the Christiansens' second claim for breach of these implied, good
faith duties, Farmers provided sworn Responses to Requests for Admissions wherein
Farmers admitted to the liability of the adverse driver, and further admitted that 1)
Farmers never communicated any denial of the Christiansens' UIM claim; 2) Farmers
never communicated any settlement authority in connection with the Christiansens'
UIM claim; and 3) Farmers never joined in any settlement negotiations in connection
with the Christiansens' UIM claim (R. 212-214). Consequently, this case has never
involved a true dispute as to the value of the claim because in the 16 months from the
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time the Christiansen's claim was presented, until the arbitrator awarded benefits,
Farmers never took a position on whether the claim was payable, and if so, in what
amount.
Both of the Christiansens' causes of action are for breach of first-party insurer
contractual duties. In order to avoid confusion, the Christiansens will hereinafter refer
to their first claim as a cause of action for "breach of written contract", and to their
second claim as a cause of action for "breach of implied contract".
Course Of Proceedings: Upon receiving Plaintiffs' Complaint, Farmers filed its
Answer and a jury demand. A Scheduling Order was agreed upon and entered by the
Court. Both parties commenced discovery, with Farmers sending out sixteen Notices
of Records Depositions, and the Christiansens serving ten Requests for Admissions,
one Interrogatory, and ten Requests for Production of Documents, including a request
for a certified copy of the Christiansens' Farmers Insurance Policy. Within one week
of seeing the Christiansens' discovery requests (responses to which the Christiansens
eventually moved to compel), Farmers filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay
the Christiansens' causes of action. After receiving from Farmers a copy of the
Christiansens' policy, and reviewing the arbitration provision, the Christiansens agreed
to stipulate to arbitration of their breach of written contract claim, but maintained their
opposition to arbitration and stay of their breach of implied contract claim, which was
outside the scope of the contractual arbitration provision (R. 99 - 116). Meanwhile,
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Farmers filed a Motion for Protective Order relative to the Christiansens' discovery
requests, which requests related to both causes of action.
Disposition In The Court Below: The Trial Court granted the Christiansens' Motion
to Compel Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions, and Farmers filed
Supplemental Responses to the Requests for Admissions.

The Court reserved its

ruling on Farmers' Motion for Protective Order in connection with the Requests for
Production of Documents until later, when Farmers provided the Court with a copy of
those requests (at which time Farmers' Motion for Protective Order was denied, except
as to Request for Production 10). Additionally, the Court relied on the Severance
Statute at Utah Code Annotated § 78-3la-108(7) to sever the UIM claim from the
litigation and into arbitration, and to limit the Stay to the UIM claim in arbitration,
allowing the claim for breach of implied contract to proceed in District Court.
Farmers then filed a Motion for Reconsideration.

The Court denied that.

Meanwhile Farmers had filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
Compelling Discovery and Denying Farmers' Motion to Stay the Action for Breach of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Since that Motion was still
pending before the Supreme Court, Farmers requested that the Trial Court stay its
above-described Orders until an Order was received from the Supreme Court on the
pending Petition. The Court denied that request. Farmers then filed a Motion for
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Expedited Stay with the Utah Supreme Court, which was granted, pending a decision
on the Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
The parties arbitrated the Christiansens' breach of written contract claim,
resulting in Arbitrator Scott Daniels' December 8, 2003 award to the Christiansens of
$74,867.50 in UIM benefits. Two days later, without notice of the arbitration award,
the Utah Supreme Court granted Farmers' Petition for Permission to Appeal the
Interlocutory Orders. Given the interim Arbitration Award, the Christiansens' filed a
Motion to Set Aside Permission to Appeal the Interlocutory Orders based on mootness
resulting from the change in circumstances, which motion was denied.
Statement Of The Facts: On May 10, 2001, Byron Christiansen was injured in a
clear liability rear end motor vehicle accident. Within one week of the accident, Mr.
Christiansen was examined by neurosurgeon John Sanders, who scheduled Mr.
Christiansen for accident-related anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with plating
at C4-5 to be performed on June 6, 2001. After obtaining a second opinion from
neurosurgeon J. Charles Rich, Mr. Christiansen opted to try to postpone the surgery, or
hopefully avoid it all together, by pursuing conservative treatment (R. 64-65).
The adverse driver's auto insurer, State Farm, tendered its $50,000.00 liability
policy limits within 30 days of receiving Mr. Christiansen's June 25, 2002 settlement
demand package (R. 61-69). Within a week of the tender, the Christiansens' own auto
insurer, Farmers Insurance Exchange, consented to the liability policy limits settlement
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and waived no-fault subrogation as to the $3,000.00 in medical payments and
$4,750.00 in lost wages it had advanced (R. 71), thereby acknowledging that the value
of Mr. Christiansen's damages exceeded the $50,000.00 liability policy limits by at
least $7,750.00.
On August 19, 2002, the Christiansens sent Farmers their $100,000.00 UIM
policy limits settlement demand package. They enclosed all of the same accidentrelated medical records, reports and bills that had triggered State Farm's prompt
tender, including Dr. Rich's future neck surgery cost estimates (R. 73, 74). On
October 24, 2002, Farmers (through attorney Michael Hansen) requested Mr.
Christiansen's tax returns for the last five years, Mr. Christiansen's sworn statement,
and documentation of Mr. Christiansen's participation in pre-accident racquetball
tournaments (R. 76). Within one week thereafter, Mr. Christiansen gave his sworn
statement, provided his tax returns, and provided the documentation of his racquetball
tournaments before the accident (R. 78, 80). During Mr. Christiansen's November 1,
2002 sworn statement, Farmers requested all of Mr. Christiansen's radiological films.
The films were copied and provided to Farmers on November 12, 2002, with a letter,
once again, asking for Farmers' position on the UIM claim (R. 82). On November 25,
2002, Mr. Christiansen sent Farmers an updated medical report from his primary
physician documenting his ongoing care.
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In the cover letter to that report, Mr.

Christiansen once again asked Farmers for its position concerning the UIM claim (R.
85, 86).
In a December 26, 2002 letter to Farmers, Mr. Christiansen reviewed his
compliance with all of Farmers' requests for additional information. Mr. Christiansen
reminded Farmers that a reasonable time for a reply to his UIM claim had passed, and
Mr. Christiansen warned Farmers that in the absence of a responsible reply within a
reasonable time, Mr. Christiansen would file a lawsuit against Farmers for his UIM
benefits and for breach of Farmers implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, in
accordance with Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange* 701 P.2d 795 (UT 1985) (R.
88,89). Still no reply.
On February 28, 2003 (six and one-half months after the UIM claim was
presented), Farmers requested a list of all of Mr. Christiansen's pre-accident doctors.
Mr. Christiansen provided the requested list to Farmers on March 11, 2003 (R. 92-93).
Although it is not yet a matter of record on appeal, Mr. Christiansen's production of
the list did not trigger any medical record requests by Farmers.
After waiting in vain for nearly eight months for Farmers to take a position on
their UIM claim, the Christiansens filed suit in Third District Court on
April 11, 2003. At the time suit was filed, no requests for additional information were
pending. Farmers had made no requests for additional information during the 30 days
prior to filing.
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Fourteen months after the Christiansens submitted their UIM claim to Farmers,
in Farmers' October 15, 2003 Supplemental Responses to Requests for Admissions,
Farmers claimed it still had, "insufficient information to determine the liability of
others involved in the accident"; and "insufficient information to make an evaluation
as to Plaintiffs entitlement to underinsured motorist benefits." (R. 213.)
During the 16 month pendency of the Christiansens' UIM claim their health
insurance was cancelled for non-payment because they could no longer afford the
premiums (R. 240, p 20).
Because of the loss of the Christiansen's health insurance, and because Dr. Rich
required payment of his surgeon's fee "up front" before performing the surgery, Dr.
Rich's fee was paid entirely from the December 8, 2003 Arbitration Award, and Byron
Christiansen finally underwent neck surgery on December 19, 2003, over two and onehalf years after it was originally scheduled.
For the facts concerning the Course of Proceedings, and the Disposition in the
Court Below, please refer to those subheadings in the preceding pages.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Court's November 2003 Stay pending resolution of the Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal effectively resolved the issues on appeal by postponing the bad
faith proceedings just long enough for the arbitration to conclude. The questions

1?

presented for interlocutory review are now moot. For purposes of this case, it no
longer matters whether the Trial Court was correct.
Farmers agrees that the Arbitration Award satisfied any alleged need for the
Christiansens to demonstrate "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits before proceeding
further in the bad faith litigation (See Farmers' Brief, pages 39, 40, 49). Likewise, the
final resolution of the arbitration removed any potential for discovery in one side of
the case to prejudice the other. Farmers' Supplemental Responses to Requests for
Admissions compelled by the Trial Court did not affect the arbitration. Nor has
Farmers claimed any such effect. Now that the arbitration is over, the only claim
remaining is that before the Trial Court for breach of implied, good faith duties.
Resuming appropriate discovery by lifting this Court's Stay of the Trial Court's Order
denying Farmers' Motion for Protective Order no longer has any arguable potential to
prejudice the arbitration. The Stay served its purpose and should now be lifted. No
further analysis is needed, as far as this case is concerned.
On the other hand, should this Court decide to use this as an opportunity to
provide further clarification and direction to others facing similar circumstances and
issues in the future, the balance of the Christiansens' Brief will be devoted to those
issues.
The Christiansens' First Cause of Action for Breach of the Written Contract,
and the Christiansens' Second Cause of Action for Farmers' Breach of the Implied
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Contract are two separate and independent causes of action, either one of which may
stand alone on its own, in the absence of the other (Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (UT 1985)).
Inspite of Beck, Farmers argues that the Christiansens' claim for breach of the
implied good faith covenant is not a separate and independent cause of action, and
may not stand on its own.

Specifically, Farmers argues that the courts must

superimpose "legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract"' showings (which
relate to the insurance policy and the UIM statute), on top of the requisite "breach of
implied contract" factors outlined in Beck, in order for the Christiansens to pursue the
breach of implied contract claim.
Farmers has failed to produce Utah caselaw involving a cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith wherein a court held "legal entitlement"
and/or "breach of the written contract" to be prerequisites to pursuit of the breach of
implied contract claim. Nor has counsel for the Christiansens been able to find any
such legal authority. In the absence of such authority, Farmers has resorted to reliance
on two groups of cases, which are simply not on point. The first is a group of Utah
cases including Lyon v. Hartford, Lima v. Chambers, Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau
Insurance, Chatterton v. Walker, Leiber v. ITT Hartford Insurance, and Estate of
Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance, none of which involved any cause of action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, such breach of

written contract cases cannot offer legitimate support to Farmers5 argument that such
cases establish "legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract" prerequisites to
maintenance of any cause of action for breach of implied contract.
The second group of cases on which Farmers' relies are "legal entitlement"
cases from other states where no Beck remedy exists, even to this day. Some of those
other states recognize statutory bad faith causes of action. Some of them recognize
bad faith tort causes of action. But none of them recognize the Beck breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing remedy controlling in Utah. Consequently,
cases from outside Utah are simply not very helpful in determining how and when the
Beck remedy applies.
Farmers also argues that the Beck case itself supports a required showing of
"legal entitlement" and "breach of written contract" before pursuit of a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Importantly, however, the term "legal
entitlement" is never mentioned, much less established as a prerequisite, in the Beck
opinion.
In Point IV of Farmers' Brief on Appeal, Farmers argues that, despite the
Christiansens' $75,000.00 award in the breach of written UIM contract claim that they
arbitrated, the Christiansens are still precluded from resuming pursuit of their bad faith
claim because a) the UIM claim was "fairly debatable"; and b) Farmers' breach of the
implied duties of good faith resulted in no real damages to the Christiansens.
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As will be explained hereafter in further detail, the "fairly debatable" defense
presumes both parties took opposing positions.

Farmers never did.

By its own

admission, Farmers never took a position. That failure at once serves to disqualify
Farmers from maintaining the "fairly debatable" defense, while at the same time
constituting an independent and actionable breach of its implied good faith duties.
As to damages, they have been properly alleged. For purposes of this appeal,
that is all that is necessary.
ARGUMENT
HAVING SERVED ITS PURPOSE, THE STAY OF THE CHRISTIANSENS'
CLAIM FOR FARMERS5 BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACT SHOULD BE
LIFTED, AND DISCOVERY SHOULD PROCEED AS PREVIOUSLY ORDERED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
POINT I:

The Issues On Appeal Are Moot.

It is undisputed that the Christiansens were found to be "legally entitled" to
UIM benefits in arbitration (see Satisfaction of Arbitration Award dated December 15,
2003, Farmers' Addendum Al). At the bottom of page 31 of Farmers' Brief on
Appeal, it stated, "Inasmuch as the arbitration award issued after this Court granted
Defendant's Petition to Appeal Interlocutory Order established Plaintiffs' "legal
entitlement' to UIM benefits, . . .."

Still referring to this case, Farmers again

acknowledged on page 49 of its Brief on Appeal, "Similarly, in this case, the insurance
company promptly paid the benefits owing once a finding of "legal entitlement" to the
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UIM benefits was made by the arbitrator, . . .." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, for
purposes of this appeal, legal entitlement is a moot point regardless of whether it is
deemed to be an additional pre-requisite to pursuit of a claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as Farmers argues.
Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in compelling Farmers Responses
to Requests For Admissions is also a moot question, since Farmers did supplement its
Responses, and the Responses did not affect the arbitration.

This conclusion is

supported by the case of Chatterton v. Walker\ 938 P.2d 255 (UT 1997). This was an
uninsured motorist case in which State Farm Insurance intervened to protect its own
interests under the UIM policy. State Farm appealed the District Court's entry of
default against Walker on the issue of liability, and also claimed error in the District
Court's refusal to grant a protective order shielding State Farm from answering certain
interrogatories. State Farm promptly moved to Stay that Order pending its Petition For
Interlocutory Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. Concurrently, State Farm provided
answers to most of the interrogatories. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded as
follows: "To the degree State Farm has fully responded to the interrogatories, its
appeal with respect to them is now moot." (Id., at 260.)
In the instant case, Farmers' Motion For Protective Order was dated July 23,
2003 (R. 128-9). The Trial Court's Order compelling Farmers' Responses to Requests
For Admissions was dated October 3, 2003 (R. 174-5).
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Farmers dated its

supplemental admissions October 15, 2003. Concurrently, Farmers filed its Petition
For Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order on October 16, 2003.
Given the similar discovery and motion pattern, and the fact that Farmers
already supplemented

its Responses, the Chatterton rationale supports the

Christiansens' position that whether the Trial Court's discovery order was an abuse of
discretion is now a moot question.
POINT II; Farmers' Theory Is Contrary To Beck v. Farmers.
Although the Christiansens' legal entitlement to UIM benefits is no longer in
dispute, prior to the Arbitration Award, Farmers based its Petition for Permission to
File Interlocutory Appeal on the theory that, in order to proceed on their cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
Christiansens should first be required to prove "legal entitlement'' to UIM benefits,
and breach of written contract. For the reasons explained below, this theory is directly
contrary to controlling law in the landmark case of Beck v. Farmers Insurance, 701
P2.d 795 (UT 1995).
The Christiansens' First Cause of Action for Farmers' breach of the written
UIM contract is governed by a) the language of the written contract (policy) itself, and
b) by Utah's UIM statute, § 31A-22-305(9)(a). The Christiansens already prevailed on
that claim. The Arbitration Award was satisfied, and the Christiansens' claim for
breach of written UIM contract no longer exists.
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The Christiansens' Second Cause of Action for Farmers' breach of the implied
contract (the covenant of good faith and fair dealing) is governed neither by the policy
language, nor by the UIM statute. Rather, it is governed by Utah common law
established by this Court in the case of Beck v. Farmers {Id.)
Prior to Beck, Utah insureds had no remedy against their insurers when they
refused to bargain or settle in good faith with their insureds. (See Lyon v. Hartford,
480 P.2d 739 (UT 1971)). In this regard, the Beck court stated as follows:
"Our ruling in Lyon left an insured without any effective remedy against
an insurer that refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the insured.
An insured who has suffered a loss and is pressed financially is at a
marked disadvantage when bargaining with an insurer over payment for
that loss . . . the temptation for an insurer to delay settlement while
pressures build on the insured is great, especially if the insurer's
exposure cannot exceed the policy limits. (Citations omitted.) In light
of these considerations, we now conclude that an insured should be
provided with a remedy . . . we hold that the good faith duty to bargain
or settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of
that duty gives rise to a claim for breach of contract. In addition, we do
not adopt the limitations suggested by Farmers [that a plaintiff must
produce evidence of bad faith wholly apart from the 'mere failure' to
bargain or settle] but hold that the refusal to bargain or settle,
standing alone, may, under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient
to prove a breach." (Id.) (Insert added for clarification. Emphasis also
added.)
The Beck Court continued, "We therefore hold that in a first-party relationship
between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are
contractual".
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In summarizing its newly created breach of implied contract cause of action, the
Beck Court stated as follows:
"We conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate
the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling the claim. (Cites omitted.) The duty of good faith
also requires the insurer to 'deal with laymen as laymen and not as
experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting' and to refrain from
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the
contract (cites omitted). These performances are the essence of what the
insured has bargained and paid for, and the insurer has the obligation to
perform them. When an insurer has breached this duty, it is liable for
damages suffered in consequence of that breach." (Id.) (Emphasis
added.)
The Beck remedy detailed above is precisely the one alleged in the
Christiansens' Second Cause of Action (R. 5, 6).
As is clear from the above excerpts, the Beck remedy was created in response to
Farmers' refusal to bargain in good faith with its Utah insureds, and was designed to be
entirely independent of any written contractual or statutory causes of action.
The now moot dispute that triggered this Interlocutory Appeal stemmed from
Farmers' renewed, but familiar, attempt to erect artificial, arbitrary barriers to recovery
for its breach of good faith duties owed to its own insureds. The showings of "legally
entitled" and "breach of written contract" which Farmers argues are pre-requisites to a
Beck cause of action, arise out of the insurance policy and the UIM statute, and have
never been identified as pre-requisites to the Beck remedy. Indeed, the term "legally
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entitled" does not appear in the Beck opinion. Nor is that term mentioned in Chatterton
v. Walker, 938 P.2d 225 (UT 1997), on which Farmers relies so heavily. Indeed,
Farmers claims, on page 9 of its Brief on Appeal, as follows: "The court in Chatterton
refused to allow discovery in a potential bad faith claim absent first showing that
plaintiff was 'legally entitled' to benefits alleged under the insurance contract." In
reality, not only is "legally entitled" never mentioned in the opinion, but importantly
there was no bad faith cause of action in Chatterton. Consequently, the Court held that
discovery requests intended to explore the mere possibility of a bad faith claim were
irrelevant, and therefore not discoverable. Although Farmers would have this Court
believe that Chatterton dicta overruled the hold in Beck, the basis for the Chatterton
holding was irrelevance, not legal entitlement.
Moreover, Farmers has failed to cite any Utah cases involving a cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where a court has
applied the barriers Farmers recommends. Nor has counsel for the Christiansens found
any such case authority.
In its Brief on Appeal, Farmers cites five Utah "legally entitled" cases which it
claims support its argument that the Christiansens are required to prove "legal
entitlement" to contractual UIM benefits before they may proceed on the breach of
implied contract allegations (Lyon v. Hartford, 480 P.2d 739 (UT 1971)(overruled on
other grounds by Beck, supra); Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (UT 1982); Peterson
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v. Utah Farm Bureau, 927 P.2d 192 (UT 1996); Estate ofBerkemeir v, Hartford, 67
P3.d 1012 (UT AV 2003); and Chatterton v. Walker. 938 P.2d 255 (UT 1997).
Interestingly, and importantly, none of these five Utah cases involve any formal bad
faith allegations or any cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Consequently, none of the dicta cited by Farmers from these five
written breach of contract cases is helpful relative to the Christiansens' cause of action
for breach of implied contract. Certainly these five cases do nothing to alter the explicit
holding in Beck that a failure to bargain or settle may be actionable standing alone. No
Utah court has ever imposed "legally entitled" or "breach of written contract" prerequisites on a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
as Farmers now asks this Court to do.
Farmers, in its Brief on Appeal, also places undo reliance on "legally entitled"
bad faith cases from other states where no Beck remedy has ever been recognized.
When it fashioned the Beck remedy, this Court acknowledged that, "this position has
not been widely adopted by other courts", and "we recognize that a majority of states
permit an insurer to institute a tort action against an insurer who fails to bargain in good
faith in a 'first party' situation . . .." (Beck, Id.) Most of the many cases cited by
Farmers in Points II and III of its Brief on Appeal, come from states that follow the tort
approach to bad faith. The rest of the cases cited by Farmers come from jurisdictions
that approach bad faith as a statutory cause of action. But none of the out-of-state cases
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cited by Farmers comes from a jurisdiction that recognizes the Beck breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing remedy which controls in Utah. Consequently,
cases from outside Utah are simply not very helpful in determining how and when the
Beck remedy applies.
In support of its argument that the Trial Court erred in allowing discovery to
proceed in the breach of implied contract case before the conclusion of the breach of
written contract case in arbitration, Farmers also mistakenly relies on two other
distinguishable groups of cases. The first group of cases, all from other jurisdictions,
involves causes of action for UIM / UM claims coupled with bad faith claims. In
those cases, those courts refused to allow/compel production of discovery pertaining to
offers of settlement and compromise. Such cases are not helpful to the issues in the
Christiansens' case, since Farmers never made any offer of settlement to the
Christiansens. Indeed, that refusal to join in negotiations is the breach at the center of
the Christiansens' remaining cause of action.
In the second group of out-of-state cases relied upon by Farmers, the courts
prevented bad faith claims from proceeding until coverage had been established. In
the Christiansens' case, coverage has never been an issue. Thus, neither group of
cases is very helpful or persuasive.
Despite clear language in the opinion to the contrary, as reviewed above,
Farmers also argues that the Beck case itself supports a preliminary showing of legal
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entitlement. In its Brief on Appeal, Farmers goes so far as to argue that Beck says,
"that an insured could not bring an action for bad faith against his or her insurer, until
a breach of that contract was established" (p. 20), and that, "It is clear that the insureds
may not simply file a bad faith claim without having first established that they are
"legally entitled" to the contract benefits and, second, that the insurance company
breached the contract." (p. 21) Yet, that is precisely what Beck did, with the Utah
Supreme Court's after-the-fact approval.
As noted earlier, the term "legally entitled" is never used in the Beck opinion,
much less established as a pre-requisite. Farmers nevertheless argues that such prerequisite was established by implication based on "the context of the claimant in that
case having already been determined to be 'legally entitled' to uninsured motorist
benefits . . .." (Farmers' Brief on Appeal, page 17.) Contrary to Farmers' description
of the Beck context, careful reading of the opinion confirms that Beck raised and
pursued the breach of written contract and the breach of implied contract claims
simultaneously, just like the Christiansens. Indeed, in Beck, discovery was open and
underway in the absence of any stay for two months after the Court bifurcated the
claims, until the UIM claim settled. Comparably, in the Christiansens' case it was two
and one-half months between the time their claims were severed, and the date of the
Arbitration Award. The fact that the Trial Court in Beck did not stay the bad faith
claim when it bifurcated it from the UIM claim conclusively refutes Farmers'
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argument that Beck supports the "legally entitled" pre-requisite and Farmers' claim
that the Trial Court erred when it severed the Christiansens' claims without staying the
bad faith litigation.
The above point was further driven home when in Beck, like in the
Christiansens case, Farmers tried to argue that for Beck to sustain a bad faith claim, he
must produce evidence "wholly apart from the 'mere failure' to bargain or settle". The
Beck Court answered as follows: "We do not adopt the limitations suggested by
Farmers, but hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, standing alone, may, under
appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a breach." In short, Farmers'
theory on appeal is directly contrary to Beck.
POINT III: Under Beck, Farmers Must Promptly Communicate Its UIM Claim
Valuation.
Farmers' argues that it was prejudicial for the Trial Court to grant the
Christiansens' Motion to Compel and to deny Farmers' Motion for Protective Order
relative to discovery requests aimed at Farmers' valuation of the Christiansens' UIM
claim, because such information could be used to Farmers' disadvantage in the severed
arbitration of the UIM benefits claim. Farmers' notion demonstrates a fundamental
lack of understanding of the Beck covenant of good faith and fair dealing. According
to Beck. "The implied obligation of good faith performance contemplates, at the very
least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine
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whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim,"

(Emphasis added.)

(Citations

omitted.) The Supreme Court added that the first-party insurer is "to refrain from
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract/9
(Emphasis added.) (Citations omitted.)

Indeed, the Court concluded that, "These

performances are the very essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for and
the insurer has the obligation to perform them." {Beck* Id.).
It stands to reason from the above excerpts in Beck, that it cannot be prejudicial
to Farmers to have to disclose its valuation of its insured's UIM claim, when Farmers
has a good faith implied duty to do so promptly in the first place. Otherwise, by
hiding its valuation of the UIM claim from its insured, and by stalling communication
of that valuation to the insured, Farmers would be in breach of its duties to 1) fairly
evaluate the claim and thereafter act promptly in rejecting or settling it; and 2) to
refrain from actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the
contract. Indeed, according to Beck, such disclosure in the form of a timely, good faith
offer (or denial) is the essence of what the insured has bargained and paid for.
Therefore, when the Trial Court granted the Christiansens' Motion to Compel
Farmers' Responses to Requests for Admissions (and later Farmers' Reponses to
Requests for Production) and denied Farmers' Motion for Protective Order, the longoverdue disclosure of Farmers' UIM valuation (which has still not been disclosed)
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could not be prejudicial. To protect Farmers from disclosing information evidencing
its valuation of the UIM claim would be to further Farmers' breach of its Beck good
faith duties. The undisputed fact on which this conclusion turns is that from August
19, 2002 when the Christiansens presented their UIM settlement demand, until the
moment notice of the Arbitration Award was received sixteen months later on
December 10, 2003, Farmers never communicated to the Christiansens its position on
their UIM claim (despite repeated written requests from the Christiansens that it do
so).
POINT IV:
Reconciled.

"Beck" And The Definition Of "Legally Entitled" Can Be

The meaning of "legally entitled" has fluctuated a lot since it was addressed for
the first time by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Lyon v. Hartford (Id.). And the
definition stills bears refinement in order to be reconcilable with the duties of good
faith and fair dealing outlined in Beck.
Lyon was an uninsured motorist breach of written contract case filed after the
injured passenger had already obtained a verdict against his own driver and two other
at-fault drivers, one of which was uninsured.

The Lyon Court used the "legally

entitled" language in a UM policy as a tool to help calculate the time when interest on
the judgment against the tortfeasor began accruing. Under the circumstances of that
case, and for the purpose of calculating interest on the award, the Lyon Court
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concluded that the claimant became "legally entitled" to recover damages (and
interest) as of the date judgment was rendered against the tortfeasors.

Given this

background, if Lyon gave birth to the "legally entitled" defense asserted by Farmers in
this case, it was a very shaky, partial, unintended birth at best.
The Utah Supreme Court next addressed the meaning of "legally entitled" in the
Lima v. Chambers case 657 P.2d 279 (UT 1982). In Lima, the Court held that an
uninsured motorist carrier may be allowed to intervene as of right in the underlying
tort action against the uninsured motorist in order to raise defenses bearing upon the
extent of the UM carrier's exposure. After citing the "legally entitled to recover
damages" language from Utah's UM statute, the Lima Court reasoned, in dicta, as
follows: "Thus, if an insured is injured by an uninsured motorist, the insured may
recover damages from his own insurance company upon showing that he is "legally
entitled" to recover those damages from the uninsured tortfeasor. This showing of
legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against the uninsured tortfeasor to litigate
the issues of liability and damages. A judgment favorable to the insured fixes the
insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment, within the policy limits."
(Emphasis added.)
Of course, UM/UIM coverages and claims have evolved a lot since Lima was
decided in 1982. For instance, the Lima comment that it typically takes a lawsuit to
determine legal entitlement is no longer true, given the prevalence of arbitration
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clauses in UM/UIM policy provisions.

Nowadays, instead of suing the

uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor, and having the UM/UIM carrier intervene, the
UM/UIM insured and the UM/UIM insurer simply arbitrate, absent interim settlement.
Nevertheless, Lima transformed the definition of "legal entitlement" from a mere
marker of time when interest began accruing, into a statutorily recognized showing
evidenced by a favorable judgment against the uninsured/underinsured tortfeasor.
Basically, the Lima Court used "legal entitlement" as a tool to show that a tort action
has a direct effect on an insurer's statutory and contractual duty to pay UM benefits,
thereby justifying a right of direct intervention. Importantly, "legal entitlement" was
not yet used to mean a prerequisite to collection of UM/UIM benefits.
The next step in the evolution of the definition of "legally entitled" was in the
Utah Court of Appeals case entitled Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau, 927 P.2d 192
(1996). Peterson was a passenger in a truck owned and operated by a co-employee
within the scope of his employment. The co-employee driver fell asleep, there was an
accident, the driver was killed, and Peterson was severely injured. After applying for,
and receiving Workers Compensation benefits, Peterson filed a UIM claim with his
own insurer. Relying on the Lyon and Lima language discussed previously, Utah Farm
Bureau successfully defended the UIM claim by arguing that the Exclusive Remedy
provision of the Workers Compensation Act prevented Peterson from pursuing a
viable claim "that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law" against the
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estate of his co-employee. Such was the context of the following language from the
Peterson opinion: "We hold that Farm Bureau's 'obligation to perform, under the
express terms of its contract with . . . [Peterson, does] not arise until their . . . [is] a
legal determination of the liability of the [under-] insured motorist and the extent of
the damages sustained,' (citation omitted), and that a judgment favorable to Peterson is
necessary to fix Farm Bureau's contractual duty to satisfy that judgment.

The

Workers' Compensation Act prevents Peterson from satisfying this requirement." In
context then, the Peterson Court used "legal entitlement" as a tool to enforce the
Exclusive Remedy provision. Importantly, it was not defined to mean that an insurer
could avoid responding to a UIM claim, with no duty to deny the claim or negotiate
until the UIM insured produced a judgment. Nevertheless, that is precisely what
Farmers has represented the Peterson case to stand for in Farmers' Brief on Appeal
(page 15).
In The Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance Company, 67 P.3d 1012 (UT
App. 2003), Hartford Insurance used the above language from Peterson to argue that
the estate of its insured was not "legally entitled" to UIM benefits because the insured
died before obtaining an arbitration award.

In Berkemeir, Hartford Insurance

conceded that Ms. Berkemeir's damages exceeded the underinsured motorist's liability
coverage; but Hartford

disputed the amount

of Berkemeir ys UIM

claim.

Unfortunately, before the UIM arbitration could be concluded, Berkemeir died of
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causes unrelated to the accident.

Hartford argued that the Peterson language

controlled, and that absent a legal determination of Berkemeir's damages, Hartford
was under no contractual duty concerning Berkemeir's claim either before or after her
death.
Retreating from the Peterson language, the Berkemeir Court held that "to
qualify under the iegally entitled to recover' language of a UIM contract, a party is
not required to establish that a legal determination has been made." Rather the
Berkemeir Court clarified, "a party is 'legally entitled to recover' if they can show the
existence of a Viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment." Applying this
relaxed standard, the Berkemeir Court stated:
"Here Hartford accepted from the outset the fact that Alexander
caused the accident that resulted in Berkemeir's injuries. Hartford,
without objection, allowed Berkemeir to enter into a settlement and
release with Alexander and his insurance company for the limits of his
policy. Then, when Berkemeir approached Hartford and submitted a
demand under the terms of her UIM policy, Hartford conceded that her
injures exceeded the limits of Alexander's policy. To determine the
amount due, the parties, under the terms of Berkemeir's policy, entered
into arbitration. We conclude that Hartford's concessions concerning
Alexander's liability and its concession that Berkemeirys damages
exceeded Alexander's policy limits, as well as its reliance on language
from Berkemeir's insurance contract relating to arbitration, qualify as a
settlement 'that is able to be reduced to judgment in a court of law'.
Thus, by its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its duty under the
contract concerning Berkemeir's UIM claim."
The Berkemeir opinion was filed in March of 2003.
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It is critical to note that if the Berkemeir Court had adopted the definition of
"legally entitled" argued by Farmers in the present interlocutory appeal, the Estate of
Berkemeir would have received nothing from Hartford.

Additionally, Farmers'

description of the Berkemeir case (on page 16 of its Brief on Appeal) is incorrect in
several respects. Specifically, it was the adverse driver's insurer that settled and paid
the liability policy limits, and it was Hartford Insurance that acknowledged that the
plaintiffs damages exceeded the liability coverage and consented to the underlying
settlement.
As demonstrated by the preceding review of the evolution of the definition of
"legally entitled" in Utah over the past 25 years, the Utah courts have never defined
"legally entitled" in a way that would excuse a UIM insurer from its implied, good
faith Beck duties. However, the variety of different contexts in which the court has
defined "legally entitled" has left room for confusion and misapplication of some of
the language in Utah's "legally entitled" cases. In order to mininme further confusion
and misunderstanding, the Christiansens' propose that the Court refine the definition
of "legally entitled" to mean that a UM/UIM insured becomes "legally entitled" to
recover UM/UIM damages when the UM/UIM insurer's timely, good faith claims
evaluation shows the benefits to be owing; not just when the insured can produce a
legal determination in the form of an arbitration award or judgment, and not just when
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the insurer acknowledges its duty under the contract by its outward conduct (as in
Berkemeir).
Since no public policy interest is served by allowing an insurer to breach its
Beck implied contractual duties and postpone payment of UIM benefits (to the ongoing
detriment of its insureds), when the insurer's own valuation already shows such
benefits to be owing, this refinement/reconciliation works to no one's disadvantage. It
merely holds the first-party insurer to its own good faith determination, rather than
putting the insured to the delay and burden of having to either 1) settle short; 2) obtain
an arbitration award; or 3) obtain a judgment, before the insured can proceed on a
cause of action for the insurer's bad faith breach of implied contract. Furthermore, in
the absence of a timely, good faith claims evaluation by the insurer (as in the
Christiansens' case), "legally entitled" should not be construed to further the insurer's
bad faith non-disclosure, delay and refusal to negotiate, by in effect, staying discovery
of the insurer's own overdue UIM benefit valuation.

This is true regardless of

concurrent arbitration of a written breach of UIM contract claim.
POINT V: Farmers' Bad Faith Breaches Are Not "Fairly Debatable", And They
Greatly Damaged The Christiansens, And Others Like Them.
While the amount of the Christiansens' UIM claim may have been fairly
debatable, Farmers' breaches of the implied duties of good faith are not. The fact that
Farmers' never denied the Christiansens' UIM claim, that Farmers never made an
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offer of settlement; that Farmers never joined in negotiations; and that Farmers' failed
to promptly investigate and evaluate the Christiansens' UIM claim is not "fairly
debatable". Indeed, Farmers has admitted to such breaches as a matter of record in
sworn Responses to the Christiansens' Requests for Admissions (R. 212,213,214 and
215). Farmers correctly argues on page 34 of its Brief on Appeal that, "An insurance
company is not required to pay every claim submitted to it". However, as the Court
taught us in Beck, there is no "fairly debatable" basis for never responding to a firstparty claim.
Relative to the Christiansen's ability to prove real damages flowing from
Farmers' breach of its implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, it is important to
understand that what Farmers did to the Christiansens' is actually more egregious than
what Farmers did to the claimant in Beck. At least in Beck, Farmers' took a position
by promptly (albeit arbitrarily) rejecting Beck's claim. With the Christiansen's, the
lack of a denial from Farmers kept leading the Christiansens to believe that Farmers
would eventually join in good faith negotiations, maybe after the Christiansens
supplemented the mountain of medical records, reports and bills already provided with
a little bit more documentation. But despite the Christiansens repeatedly and promptly
supplementing their claims information with whatever Farmers asked for, Farmers
never did take a position. It never did bargain. It never negotiated. It never even
rejected the claims outright, which would have at least saved the Christiansen's eight
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months (the time wasted waiting for a reply, before filing suit) of financial hardship,
saved them from losing their family's health insurance for inability to continue to
afford the premiums, preserved their good credit rating from ruin, and enabled Mr.
Christiansen to afford to have his surgery eight months sooner, saving him eight
months of pain and suffering.

Such are precisely the kinds of general and

consequential damages for which the Beck Court fashioned a remedy. Moreover, the
Christiansens have alleged that Farmers was not only doing this to them, but that
Farmers had instituted, and was following, a deliberate policy of stonewalling its Utah
UIM claimants generally. Such damages, together with the attorneys' fees incurred as
a result of Farmers' bad faith breaches, are real, and are properly alleged. Besides,
whether Farmers' bad faith breaches were "fairly debatable" and whether the
Christiansens will be successful in proving the damages suffered due to Farmers' bad
faith breaches are considerably outside the scope of the limited issues presented for
review in this interlocutory appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts, arguments and legal authorities, the
Christiansens respectfully request the Court to either 1) declare the issues presented for
interlocutory appeal to be moot, or 2) affirm the Trial Court's Orders by finding that it
did not abuse its discretion in compelling discovery, denying the protective order and
denying the motion to stay breach of implied contract action. In either event, the
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Christiansens ask that this case be remanded to the Trial Court, that the Stay be lifted,
and that the proceedings below be allowed to continue where they left off.
Should the Court decide to use this case as an opportunity to provide further
clarification and guidance on the issues discussed herein, the Christiansens request that
the Court hold that "legally entitled" and "breach of written contract" are not
prerequisites to an action for breach of the Beck implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
Further, the Christiansens request that the Court refine the definition of "legally
entitled" to mean that a first-party insured becomes "legally entitled" to UM/UIM
benefits when the UM/UIM insurer's own timely, good failh claim valuation
determines an amount of benefits to be owing; and that in the absence of a timely,
good faith communication of the insurer's value determination to the insured,
discovery of such value determination in a resulting bad faith action shall not be
deemed prejudicial to the insurer's interests in any concurrent arbitration of the
UM/UIM claim. This would reconcile "legally entitled to recover" language found in
Utah's UM/UIM statute and most auto insurance policies, with the Beck covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. This proposed solution would also allow a trial court to
retain discretion to stay whatever claims it deems appropriale pursuant to the
Severance Statute, after considering the nature of discovery sought and the
circumstances of each particular case. For example, the courts would still be fully

empowered to order the discretionary stay of any bad faith claim that might appear to
have been filed along with a UIM claim solely for the purpose of obtaining access to
the insurer's files. This should minimize Farmers' concerns in that regard.
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